From Violence to Reform: How 2007 Led to Kenya's New Constitution

1,500 dead. 600,000 displaced. Two commissions. One accord. And a constitution that transformed Kenya's democracy. The story of how 2007's worst moments led to 2010's greatest achievement is a story of how crisis, when met with political will, can produce lasting reform.

The 2007-2008 post-election crisis was the darkest chapter in Kenya's post-independence history. What began as a disputed election result on December 30, 2007 escalated into weeks of ethnic violence, displacement, and economic devastation. But from the ashes of that crisis emerged a reform process that fundamentally reshaped Kenyan governance.

This article traces the timeline from the disputed December 2007 election through the violence, the mediation, the commissions of inquiry, the 2010 constitutional referendum, and the ICC cases that followed.

Timeline of Crisis and Reform

December 27, 2007: Election Day

Approximately 9.87 million Kenyans voted across 210 constituencies. The Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK) began tallying votes at the Kenyatta International Conference Centre (KICC). Early results showed Raila Odinga of ODM in the lead.

December 30, 2007: The Disputed Declaration

After Central Province results arrived late and dramatically shifted the tally, ECK chairman Samuel Kivuitu declared Mwai Kibaki the winner with 4,584,721 votes (46.4%) to Raila's 4,352,993 (44.1%). Kibaki was immediately sworn in at State House. Within hours, violence erupted in Kisumu, Nairobi's informal settlements, and the Rift Valley.

January-February 2008: The Violence

The post-election violence unfolded in three phases, as later documented by the Waki Commission:

• Phase 1 (Dec 30 - Jan 3): Spontaneous violence. Protests in ODM strongholds — Kisumu, Kibera, Mathare, Eldoret — turned violent. Mobs targeted perceived Kibaki supporters, particularly Kikuyu communities living outside Central Province.
• Phase 2 (Jan 3 - Jan 15): Organised retaliation. In parts of Central Province, Naivasha, and Nakuru, organised groups targeted Luo, Kalenjin, and Luhya communities. The Naivasha attacks and the Kiambaa church burning (where at least 35 people were killed) marked the worst of this phase.
• Phase 3 (Jan 15 - Feb 28): Continuing violence and mediation. Sporadic violence continued while international mediation efforts intensified. The African Union appointed a Panel of Eminent African Personalities led by former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan.

The human toll was devastating:

• Approximately 1,500 people killed (the Waki Commission documented 1,133 deaths but acknowledged the actual number was likely higher)
• Over 600,000 people internally displaced
• An estimated 900 cases of sexual violence documented
• Thousands of properties destroyed, particularly in the Rift Valley and Nairobi
• The economy contracted sharply — tourism collapsed, agricultural exports were disrupted, and the stock market lost significant value

February 28, 2008: The National Accord

After weeks of mediation by Kofi Annan and his team, Kibaki and Raila signed the National Accord and Reconciliation Act. The accord:

• Created the position of Prime Minister for Raila Odinga
• Established a grand coalition government with cabinet positions shared between PNU and ODM
• Set up commissions to investigate the violence and the election
• Committed both sides to constitutional reform

The Two Commissions

The Krigler Commission (IREC)

The Independent Review Commission, chaired by South African judge Johann Krigler, investigated the election itself. Its key findings:

• The ECK was unable to verify the results of the presidential election
• There was evidence of results manipulation at both constituency and national levels
• The voter register contained significant irregularities
• The ECK lacked the institutional capacity, independence, and professionalism to conduct a credible election
• The commission recommended dissolving the ECK and creating a new electoral body

The Waki Commission (CIPEV)

The Commission of Inquiry into Post-Election Violence (CIPEV), chaired by Kenyan judge Philip Waki, investigated the violence. Its key findings:

• The violence was not spontaneous — it was planned and organised by political and business leaders
• Security forces used excessive force in some areas while standing by in others
• State institutions failed to prevent or stop the violence
• The commission compiled a sealed envelope of names of individuals suspected of organising violence, to be handed to a special tribunal or the International Criminal Court

The sealed envelope became one of the most consequential documents in Kenyan political history. When Kenya failed to set up a special tribunal to try the suspects, the Waki Commission's evidence was forwarded to the International Criminal Court (ICC).

The Path to the 2010 Constitution

The National Accord included a commitment to comprehensive constitutional reform. A Committee of Experts was appointed to draft a new constitution, building on previous reform efforts dating back to the Bomas process and the failed 2005 referendum.

The new constitution was completed in 2010 and put to a referendum on August 4, 2010. It passed with 67.25% approval (6.09 million "Yes" votes versus 2.97 million "No" votes). Turnout was 72%.

The 2010 Constitution introduced transformative changes:

• Devolution: 47 counties with elected governors, senators, women representatives, and Members of County Assemblies replaced the 8-province system
• 50%+1 threshold: A presidential candidate must win more than half the valid votes plus at least 25% of votes in 24 of 47 counties
• Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC): Replaced the discredited ECK with a constitutionally protected independent body
• Bill of Rights: Comprehensive protections including the right to fair administrative action and the right to fair hearing
• Supreme Court: Given original jurisdiction over presidential election disputes, with a mandatory 14-day timeline for decisions
• Two-term limit: Presidents limited to two five-year terms
• Two-thirds gender rule: No more than two-thirds of any elected body can be of one gender

The ICC Cases

In December 2010, ICC Prosecutor Luis Moreno Ocampo named six Kenyans as suspects in two cases related to the post-election violence:

Case 1:

• Uhuru Kenyatta — then Deputy Prime Minister, later President (2013-2022)
• Francis Muthaura — Head of Civil Service
• Mohammed Hussein Ali — former Police Commissioner

Case 2:

• William Ruto — then Minister for Higher Education, later Deputy President (2013-2022) and President (2022-present)
• Henry Kosgey — then Minister for Industrialisation
• Joshua arap Sang — radio journalist

The ICC cases had a profound impact on Kenyan politics. Kenyatta and Ruto, who had been on opposite sides in 2007 (Kibaki's PNU versus Raila's ODM), formed an alliance for the 2013 election. Their "Jubilee" coalition was built partly on mutual interest in facing The Hague together and partly on combining their Central Kenya and Rift Valley vote bases.

Both cases were eventually terminated — Kenyatta's in 2015 due to insufficient evidence after the prosecution cited witness interference and non-cooperation by the Kenyan government, and Ruto's in 2016 when the trial chamber declared a mistrial. Neither was convicted. But the ICC process shaped a decade of Kenyan politics, forging the Kenyatta-Ruto alliance that governed from 2013 to 2022.

The Reform Balance Sheet

Two decades after the crisis, how much did the reforms actually change? Here is a balance sheet:

What changed for the better:

1. Devolution works. County governments now control approximately 15% of national revenue. Services like healthcare and rural roads are managed locally. Governors are accountable to voters, not to the president.
2. The 50%+1 rule forces coalition-building. Presidential candidates must seek support beyond their ethnic base. No one can win with a single community.
3. The Supreme Court can nullify elections. This happened in 2017, proving that judicial oversight of elections is real.
4. Violence has decreased. The 2013, 2017, and 2022 elections, while tense, did not approach the scale of 2007-2008 violence.

What remains problematic:

1. Ethnic voting persists. Counties still vote as blocs, and presidential politics remains a contest between ethnic coalitions.
2. The IEBC has struggled with credibility. The 2017 presidential election was nullified due to irregularities, and the commission has faced repeated leadership crises.
3. Accountability for 2007 remains incomplete. No one was convicted at the ICC. Most internally displaced persons received inadequate compensation.
4. Turnout is declining. From 86% in 2013 to 65% in 2022, voter disengagement is growing despite — or perhaps because of — the expanded democratic system.

For the broader story of how Kenya's democracy evolved across four elections, read Four Elections, Four Stories. For how turnout has changed since the reforms, see The Great Turnout Decline. And for how election petitions grew after the new constitution, read Election Petitions: From 36 in 2007 to 446 in 2017.

What This Pattern Means for 2027

Historical election numbers are most useful when they are turned into field actions. For From Violence to Reform: How 2007 Led to Kenya's New Constitution, your campaign can use this history to decide where to invest agents, transport, and voter mobilisation before election day.

• Set target turnout by ward: Use past turnout as your baseline, then assign a realistic uplift target for each ward and polling centre.
• Track strongholds hour by hour: If turnout in your core areas is below plan by midday, deploy rapid mobilisation teams early, not late.
• Protect evidence quality: Keep a clean chain of results forms, incident notes, and station-level logs to support legal review if needed.

For primary reference material, review the IEBC official resources, Kenya Law election jurisprudence, and the IEBC election regulations.

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