IEBC Under Siege: How the 2022 Election Exposed Institutional Weakness

When four of seven IEBC commissioners walked out of the national tallying centre at Bomas of Kenya on August 15, 2022, they didn't just challenge the presidential results — they shattered the myth that Kenya's electoral commission speaks with one voice. The 4-3 split between the Chebukati faction and the Cherera faction exposed institutional fractures that go far deeper than one election.

The Cherera Rebellion

Commissioners Juliana Cherera (vice chair), Francis Wanderi, Justus Nyang'aya, and Irene Masit declared at the Serena Hotel that they 'could not take ownership' of the presidential results declared by Chairman Wafula Chebukati. Their stated reasons:

• The verification process was not completed to their satisfaction
• They had been excluded from key decisions in the final tallying stages
• They could not verify the mathematical accuracy of the final figures

The rebellion raised profound questions: Were the four commissioners acting on genuine integrity concerns, or were they political agents seeking to delegitimize a valid result? The Supreme Court later suggested the latter, calling their actions 'unlawful and unconstitutional.'

Institutional Fractures Pre-Dating 2022

The IEBC's dysfunction didn't begin on election day. The commission had been in crisis for years:

• 2017: ICT Director Chris Msando murdered days before the election — the crime remains unsolved
• 2017: Supreme Court nullified the presidential election due to 'illegalities and irregularities'
• 2018: Three commissioners — Roselyne Akombe, Paul Kurgat, and Margaret Mwachanya — resigned, citing political interference and intimidation
• 2019-2020: Commission operated with only three of seven members, barely maintaining a quorum
• 2021: Four new commissioners appointed through a process some critics called politicized

By the time the 2022 election arrived, the IEBC was a commission of strangers — the four new appointees had worked with Chebukati for less than a year.

Operational Challenges

Beyond the political drama, the IEBC faced significant operational challenges:

• Budget shortfalls: The commission requested KES 47 billion for the election but received KES 40.2 billion — a 14% shortfall that forced cuts in voter education and logistics
• Staff turnover: Over 40% of constituency returning officers were new to their roles, having been recruited within six months of the election
• Technology procurement: The KIEMS kit tender was plagued by litigation, delaying deployment and training
• Voter register audit: An independent audit of the register by KPMG found 246,465 deceased persons still on the rolls — a cleanup the IEBC didn't complete before election day

The Trust Deficit

Public trust in the IEBC has been declining steadily. Pre-election surveys by Afrobarometer and TIFA Research showed:

• 2013: 65% of Kenyans trusted the IEBC to conduct a fair election
• 2017 (pre-repeat): 48% trusted the IEBC
• 2022: 38% trusted the IEBC

This 27-point decline in public trust over nine years represents one of the steepest erosions of institutional confidence in Kenya's democratic history. When nearly two-thirds of the population lacks confidence in the body that runs elections, democratic legitimacy itself is at stake.

The Aftermath

Following the election, the four dissenting commissioners faced consequences:

• Cherera, Wanderi, Nyang'aya, and Masit were investigated by a tribunal appointed by President Ruto
• All four were eventually removed from office
• Chebukati's term expired in January 2023, and he was not reappointed
• By mid-2023, the IEBC had zero commissioners — effectively ceasing to exist as a functional body

For over a year, Kenya had no functioning electoral commission. No voter registration, no by-election management, no electoral boundary reviews. The institution that underpins democratic governance was simply... absent.

Lessons for 2027

Rebuilding the IEBC requires more than just appointing new commissioners. Kenya needs:

• Depoliticized appointments: A selection process insulated from political manipulation
• Institutional memory: Career civil servants who provide continuity regardless of commissioner turnover
• Financial independence: Guaranteed funding that doesn't depend on political goodwill
• Technology sovereignty: In-house technical capacity rather than dependence on external vendors

The IEBC's 2022 implosion is a cautionary tale about what happens when democratic institutions become battlegrounds for political actors. Independent vote tracking through systems like Votrack becomes essential when the official referee is compromised.

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